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Abstract 
Assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we reconsider the merger paradox in the 
cases of quantity-setting and price-setting games. We investigate whether emergence of 
the merger paradox depends on the degree of product differentiation of the outsider, 
irrespective of the mode of competition. In particular, being different from the result of 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we show that the merger paradox arises in the case of 
price-setting games if the degree of product differentiation of the outsider is sufficiently 
small. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a seminal paper, Salant et al. (1983) demonstrated that merger is unprofitable for the 
merging firms under Cournot (quantity) competition in a homogenous product market 
unless at least 80% of the firms in the industry participate. Since then, there have been 
many solutions proposed for the merger paradox. For example, one way to resolve the 
paradox is to introduce merger-related synergies and scale economies.1 
In this paper, without assuming such merger-related synergies, we reconsider the 
well-known “merger paradox”; in other words, an incentive for merger and profitability 
of insiders (i.e., merging firms) and an external effect on the profits of outsiders 
(non-merging firms). In particular, we focus on the properties of products horizontally 
differentiated between firms. 
In empirical studies of horizontal mergers with differentiated products, Baker and 
Bresnahan (1985, p.427), who estimate the demand system of brewing firms’ mergers in 
the US, point out that “a merger in an industry with differentiated products increases the 
market power of the merged firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes 
                                                  
1 For example, Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider the 
welfare (and profit) effect of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous product market, 
assuming scale economies, synergies, and supply-side externalities as merger 
efficiencies (e.g., cost advantages). 
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and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes.”2 Exploiting their idea, 
developing an asymmetric product differentiation model, we examine the profitability 
of a merger in the cases of quantity-setting (Cournot) and price-setting (Bertrand) 
games. 
Since Salant et al. (1983), there have been many attempts to resolve the merger 
paradox. However, in this paper, we focus on the literature examining horizontal merger 
with product differentiation. Hsu and Wang (2010), whose work is very close to our 
model, consider horizontal merger in the case of Cournot oligopoly (i.e., competition 
between four firms) with product differentiation. Assuming symmetric product 
differentiation, they show that a merger is profitable for the merging firms if the degree 
of product differentiation is sufficiently large and that the outsider firms always benefit 
from a merger. As shown below, our result is the same result as theirs in the case of 
asymmetric product differentiation with three firms. Similarly, Gelves (2014) examines 
the merger paradox in the case of Cournot oligopoly (i.e., competition with n-firms) 
with product differentiation and cost asymmetry. To sum up, horizontal mergers of 
strategic substitutes in the case of quantity-setting games are rarely profitable. However, 
if the products are sufficiently differentiated, mergers can generate at least no loss of 
                                                  
2 See Nevo (2000), who develops a new methodology to estimate mergers with 
differentiated products in the case of the ready-to-eat cereal industry. 
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profit. 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985), whose work is also very close to our model, 
demonstrate that price-setting games of strategic complements in a differentiated 
products market yield profitable mergers. They assume symmetric product 
differentiation. However, introducing asymmetric product differentiation—that is, the 
degree of product differentiation between the firms differs—we demonstrate that the 
merger paradox arises in the case of price-setting games if the degree of product 
differentiation of the outsider is sufficiently small; in other words, the product of the 
outsider is a close substitute to that of the insider. 
   In Section 2, we develop a three-firm model with asymmetric product differentiation, 
using a simple quadratic function. We then derive the equilibrium outcomes in the cases 
of premerger and merger under quantity-setting games. We demonstrate the condition 
under which the merger paradox arises. In Section 3, we examine the same problem in 
the case of price-setting games. As an application of our model, we address the choice 
of internal decision-making structure of a multidivisional firm and the possibility of 
internal competition. Finally, in Section 4, we summarize our results and present 
remaining issues. 
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2. Model 
 
2.1 Setup: Asymmetric product differentiation 
To consider the merger paradox, we assume a horizontally differentiated products 
market where three firms  kji ,,  provide their products. That is, each firm provides 
one product; therefore, we refer to firm i (j, k) and product i (j, k) interchangeably. The 
three products are substitutes for each other. However, with respect to the degree of 
product differentiation between the products, we assume that the degree of product 
differentiation between products  ji,  is different from that between products  ki,  
and from that between products  ;,kj  i.e., asymmetric product differentiation (see 
Figure 1).  
Based on the assumption mentioned above, we consider a representative consumer 
with the following quasi-linear utility function for three horizontally differentiated 
products  kji ,,  and one numeraire product. 
  ,,, 0qqqquU kji   
      ,21,, 222 kjkijikjikjikji qqqqqqqqqqqqAqqqu      (1) 
,0qqpqpqpy kkjjii   ,10 p  
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where   ,1,0   ,1,0  and .   We note that the degree of product 
differentiation parameters,   and  , implies the degree of product substitution 
between the products. Thus, if , 1  ,0  the degree of product differentiation is 
small (large); in other words, the degree of product substitution is large (small). 
Furthermore, if ,)(    the degree of substitution between products  ji,  is larger 
(smaller) than that between products  ki,  and that between products  .,kj  
Based on equation (1), we derive the following inverse demand functions for three 
products. 
,kjii qqqAp                                   (2.1) 
,kijj qqqAp                                  (2.2) 
.jikk qqqAp                                   (2.3) 
To simplify the analysis and to focus on the properties of asymmetric product 
differentiation, we assume that marginal costs of production are zero.3 Thus, the profit 
functions of the firms are given by 
  ,ikjiiii qqqqAqp                           (3.1) 
  ,jkijjjj qqqqAqp                          (3.2) 
  .kjikkkk qqqqAqp                          (3.3) 
                                                  
3 In the case of constant marginal costs, we can derive the same results as in the case of 
zero marginal costs. 
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   In what follows, we consider the cases of premerger and merger under 
quantity-setting games. Then, comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the two cases, we 
examine the merger paradox. 
 
2.2 Quantity-setting games 
First, we examine the case of premerger where the firms non-cooperatively determine 
the outputs. Based on equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), we obtain the following 
first-order conditions (FOC) of profit maximization. 
,02 

kjiii
i
i qqqAqp
q
                    (4.1) 
,02 

kijjj
j
j qqqAqp
q
                   (4.2) 
.02 

jikkk
k
k qqqAqp
q
                    (4.3) 
For equations (4.1) and (4.2), we assume that .ji qq   Therefore, we derive the 
following equilibrium outputs and profits in the case of premerger (N). 
 Aqq NjNi 222 2     and   ,22 22 2 AqNk             (5) 
 
2
222
2





 ANjNi 
 and   .22 22
2
2 




 ANk 
    (6) 
Second, we examine the case of merger (M), where firms  ji,  are insiders (I) and 
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firm  k  is an outsider (O).4 In particular, the merged firm (i.e., insider) decides the 
outputs to maximize the following joint profits; i.e., equations (3.1) and (3.2). 
    .jkijikjijjiijiM qqqqAqqqqAqpqp      (7) 
The outsider firm  k  decides the output to maximize its profit; i.e., equation (3.3). 
In this case, we derive the following FOCs. 
,022 

kjijii
i
M
qqqAqqp
q
             (8.1) 
,022 

kijijj
j
M
qqqAqqp
q
             (8.2) 
.02 

jikkk
k
k qqqAqp
q
                    (8.3) 
For equations (8.1) and (8.2), we assume that .ji qq   Therefore, we derive the 
following equilibrium outputs and profits in the case of merger. 
 Aqq MIjMIi 2222 2    and ,221 2 AqMOk           (9) 
   
2
2222
21





 AMIjMIi 
  and .22
1 2
2 




 AMOk 
  (10) 
 
2.3 Merger paradox under quantity-setting games 
We examine the merger paradox; in other words, incentives for merger (or profitability 
                                                  
4 We denote this case as a homogenous merger. Similarly, a heterogeneous merger is 
where firms  ki,  are insiders and firm  j  is an outsider. In the Appendix, we 
examine that case. 
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of merger). Taking equations (6) and (10), with respect to profits, we derive the 
following relationship. 
     
    ,)(0)(112
22
2)(222
21)(
*24
2
2
2
2

















 AANiMIi   (11) 
where  .111*    
   Similarly, based on equations (6) and (10), we obtain the external effect of merger 
on the profit of the outsider  ,k  i.e., merger externality, as follows: .NkMOk    
   Therefore, in view of equation (11), we summarize the results as the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
Under quantity-setting games with asymmetric product differentiation, if the degree of 
product differentiation of the outsider is small (large) —in other words, the degree of 
product substitution is large (small)—the merger paradox arises (does not arise). 
Furthermore, the merger externality on the profit of the outsider is positive. 
 
This result echoes that of Hsu and Wang (2010, Proposition 1).5 In our model, if 
                                                  
5 Hsu and Wang (2010) deal with the case of symmetric product differentiation; i.e., 
.   In this case, we obtain the following relationship. 
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,)( *   the merger is unprofitable (profitable) for the merged firms  ji, , compared 
with premerger. 
In a horizontally differentiated products market, the merged firms only lose a 
modest portion of the combined premerger market shares. Thus, if the degree of product 
differentiation is sufficiently small—in other words, the degree of product substitution is 
large, i.e., *  —the market share lost by the merged firms is more than offset by the 
increased prices afforded by the firm’s market power coming from the merger. 
Furthermore, because the reduction of market share of the merged firms increases the 
market share of the outsider by strategic substitutes, the profit of the outsider increases, 
compared with premerger. 
Proposition 1 implies that firms ji,  do not have an incentive to merge if the 
degree of product differentiation of the outsider is small. In other words, it is a 
necessary condition for firms ji,  to merge that the degree of product differentiation of 
the outsider is sufficiently large. Furthermore, it is preferable for the outsider k  that 
firms ji,  form the merger. Thus, we examine the profitability of the insiders and the 
outsider, given that the merger is profitable; i.e., .*    
In view of equation (10), we derive the following relationship between the profits of 
                                                                                                                                                  
.)(555.00)(12)( 23   NiMIi  
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the insiders and the outsider. 
,MOkMIjMIi    if ,64.08
1711                 (12.1) 
,)()( #  MOkMIjMIi  if ,064.08
171    (12.2) 
where     .3
11212#

 
  
   Given equation (12.2), if the degree of product differentiation between the insiders 
is sufficiently large and that of the outsider is small, the profit of the insiders is larger 
than that of the outsider. Otherwise, the opposite holds. 
   Taking equations (11), (12.1), and (12.2), with respect to the cut-off values, i.e., ,*  
,#  the following relationship holds. 
.)(3
1)( *#                                  (13) 
Based on equations (12.1), (12.2), and (13), we derive the following. 
If ,03
1    then it holds that .)()( # MOkMIjMIi    
If ,3
1
8
171    then it holds that .)( #* MOkMIjMIi    
If ,8
1711    then it holds that .* MOkMIjMIi    
Thus, we summarize the results as the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1 
Given that the merger is profitable (i.e., *  ), the profit of the outsider is larger than 
12 
 
that of the insiders, (i) if both the degree of product differentiation between the insiders 
(i.e., 03
1   ) and that of the outsider is large (i.e., #  ), and (ii) if the degree of 
product differentiation between the insiders is small; i.e., .3
11    
 
We note that, given that the merger paradox arises (i.e., *  ), either if (i) 
8
1711    or if (ii) 3
1
8
171    and ,#*    then the profit of the 
outsider is larger than that of the insiders. We denote this situation as the big merger 
paradox.  
 
 
3. Merger Paradox under Price-setting Games 
 
3.1 Price-setting games with asymmetric product differentiation 
We proceed to analyze the merger paradox in the case of price-setting games. Taking the 
linear inverse demand functions in the case of quantity-setting games—i.e., equations 
(2.1), (2.2), and (2.3)—we derive the following linear demand functions for three 
products. 
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  ,1
1
11
11
22
22









 kjii pppAq 




         (14.1) 
  ,1
1
11
11
22
22









 kijj pppAq 




        (14.2) 
,111
211 2







 jikk pppAq 




        (14.3) 
where    0211 2    and we assume that ).0(21 2    
   Regarding equations (14.1) and (14.2), we address the case in which products  ji,  
are substitutes but the cross effect of prices on the demand for the other product is not 
necessarily that of substitutes. In particular, the effect of an increase in the price of 
product  j  on the demand for product i  depends on the degree of the parameters; 
i.e., .)(0)(1 2
2

 


j
i
p
q  Furthermore, in the case of merger where 
firms  ji,  are the merged firms, the reaction function of the merged firms shifts down, 
compared with the case of premerger if .   This is not the case of Deneckere and 
Davidson (1985) assuming symmetric product differentiation. In other words, as shown 
below, the merger paradox can arise under price-setting games in our model where we 
assume asymmetric product differentiation. 
   To examine this hypothesis, we translate the demand equations system—i.e., (14.1), 
(14.2), and (14.3)—to the following: ,~1
2
ii qq 
   ,~1
2
jj qq 
   and 
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,~1
2
kk qq 
   where 
,~ kjii pppq                                  (15.1) 
,~ kijj pppq                                  (15.2) 
.~ jikk pppq                                 (15.3) 
Furthermore, regarding the parameters, we assume that ,01
1 
 A
  
,01
21 
 A
 ,)(0)(1
2
2
2

 
    ,01
1
2 
 
  and 
.01  
  Similarly for the profit functions, we have ,~1
2
iii qp
   
,~1
2
jjj qp
   and .~1
2
kkk qp
   In what follows, we use these profit 
functions. 
 
3.2 Merger paradox and negative externality 
By the same procedure as that under quantity-setting games, we derive the following 
outcomes in the cases of premerger and merger. 
In the case of premerger under price-setting games (PN), we derive the following. 
D
pp PNj
PN
i
  2  and   ,22
D
pPNk
            (16) 
22 21



 


D
PN
j
PN
i
 and   ,221 22 


 


D
PN
k
    (17) 
where         .011 212222 2
2

 
D  
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   In the case of merger under price-setting games (PM), we derive the following. 
PM
PMI
j
PMI
i D
pp   2  and   ,122 PMPMOk Dp
           (18) 
  22 211 


 
 PMPMIjPMIi D
 and   ,1221 22 


 

 PMPMOk D
   (19) 
where          .011 1212222 2
2

 
PMD  
   Using equations (17) and (19), we derive the profitability of merger under 
price-setting games as follows. 
 
,0)(
21)(211)(
2222




 




 

X
DDPM
PN
i
PMI
i

   
where    .02  X 6 Therefore, we have 
.)()(   PNiPMIi                           (20) 
Similarly, for the merger externality, we derive the following. 
  ,0)(0)(2
)()(



 PNkPMOkPNkPMOk pp  
                                                  
6 Regarding X in equation (18), we derive the following relationship. 
        ,0)(11 10)(2 222     xX  
where        .13111 422  x  In this case, we can rewrite as 
follows:       .11211 222  x  Given the assumptions, 
because it holds that ,0x  we obtain .0X  
16 
 
where   .02    Thus, we have 
.)()(   PNkPMOk                           (21) 
   Therefore, in view of equations (20) and (21), we summarize the results as the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 
Under price-setting games with asymmetric product differentiation, if the degree of 
product differentiation of the outsider is small (large)—in other words, the degree of 
product substitution is large (small), i.e.,  )( —the merger paradox arises (does 
not arise). Furthermore, the merger externality on the profit of the outsider is negative 
(positive). 
 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that the merger paradox does not arise in the 
case of oligopolistic price competition. However, assuming asymmetric product 
differentiation, the result in the case of price competition is the same as in the case of 
quantity competition. That is, if the degree of product differentiation of the outsider is 
small—in other words, the degree of product substitution of the outsider is large—the 
merger paradox arises. 
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Furthermore, although the externality on the profit of the outsider in the case of 
quantity competition is always positive, the effect depends on the degree of the 
parameters in the case of price competition. In particular, if the degree of product 
differentiation of the outsider is small, the merger reduces the profit of the outsider, 
compared with the case of premerger. 
   To sum up, in the case of price-setting games, the strategic complements hold in the 
cases of premerger and merger. However, given asymmetric product differentiation, if 
the degree of product differentiation of the outsider is small, the reaction curves of the 
merged firms can shift down, so that the merger paradox and negative externality arise. 
 
3.3 Application 
We can apply our model to analyze an internal organization of a multidivisional firm.7 
That is, we suppose that a multidivisional firm providing products  ji,  and an 
outsider providing product k  in a market. In this case, we examine the problem that 
the multidivisional firm decides on an optimal decision-making structure; i.e., 
centralization or decentralization. In view of equations (11) and (20), if the degree of 
product differentiation of the outsider is sufficiently small, the multidivisional firm 
                                                  
7 Regarding this issue, for example, see Creane and Davidson (2004). 
18 
 
should choose the decentralization of the quantity (price) decision. That is, it maximizes 
the total profit of the multidivisional firm in which divisions i  and  j  
non-cooperatively decide their quantity (price). This implies internal competition in the 
multidivisional firm. Otherwise, the multidivisional firm itself should decide the 
quantities (prices) of its two divisions to maximize its joint profits. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we considered the merger paradox and 
externality in the cases of quantity-setting and price-setting games. In particular, we 
demonstrated that, irrespective of the mode of games, the merger paradox arises if the 
degree of product differentiation of the outsider is sufficiently small; in other words, the 
property of the outsider’s product is similar to that of the merging firms. Conversely, 
even if the products of the merging firms are homogeneous (identical) to each other, if 
the product of the outsider is sufficiently different from their products, the merger 
paradox does not arise. In this case, the merger externality on the profit of the outsider is 
positive. 
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   The contribution of our paper is to show that the merger paradox can arise in the 
case of price competition. This result is different from that of Deneckere and Davidson 
(1985), although it depends on the assumption of asymmetric product differentiation. It 
is shown in the Appendix that the firm does not have an incentive to form a merger if its 
product is similar to that of the outsider. In other words, the firms producing similar 
products are likely to form a merger. 
Our result has some limitations because the model is based on specific assumptions; 
e.g., linear functions, three firms, and no production costs. In future research, we intend 
to discuss more general cases, relaxing the assumptions and extending the model to 
oligopolistic competition. Furthermore, we should consider the welfare effects of 
mergers. 
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Appendix: The Heterogeneous Merger Case 
To simplify the analysis, we suppose that .1    In this case, with respect to the 
homogeneous merger case, based on equations (11), (12.1), and (12.2), we derive the 
following results. 
(1.i) .)(765.022)(   NjNiMIjMIi  
(1.ii) .NkMOk    
(1.iii) .MIjMIiMOk    
   Thus, if the degree of product differentiation of the outsider is large, the big merger 
paradox arises. 
   We examine the heterogeneous merger case where firms  ki,  form a merger and 
firm  j  is an outsider. In this case, we can easily derive the following outcomes at the 
equilibrium (HM). 
  ,16
2 AqHMIi 


    ,12
1 AqHMIk   and ,3
1 AqHMOj      (A.1) 
  ,118
2 2AHMIi 
 
    ,112
3 2AHMIk 
 
  and .9
1 2AHMOj           (A.2) 
   Based on equations (6) and (A.2), we obtain the following results. 
(2.i) ,NiHMIi    ,NkHMIk    and .HMIiHMIk    
(2.ii) .NjHMOj    
(2.iii) HMIiHMOj    and .)(7
5)(   HMOjHMIk  
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As for (2.i), the product of the outsider  j  is identical to that of the insideri  of the 
merged firms. As shown by Salant et al. (1983), this case is the same as the case of 
quantity-setting games in a homogeneous product market. On the other hand, because 
the product of the insider  k  is horizontally differentiated, its profit increases 
compared with the case of premerger. Taking the results in the case of homogeneous 
merger, (2.i) implies that incentives to form a merger differ between the firms. In other 
words, whether a firm has an incentive to form a merger depends on the degree of 
product differentiation of the outsiders, not that of the insiders. For (2.ii), we have the 
same result as in the homogenous merger case; i.e., (1.ii). Finally, for (2.iii), the profit 
of the insider i  is smaller than that of the outsider  j  because their products are 
identical. However, whether the profit of the insider  k  increases depends on the 
degree of product differentiation of the insider k . In particular, if 17
5  , as 
mentioned above, the profit of the insider  k  is smaller than that of the outsider  j . 
On the contrary, if ,7
5  the profit of the insider  k  is larger than that of the 
outsider j  because the degree of product differentiation increases. 
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Figure 1: The properties of product differentiation between three products 
 1,0  and  1,0  
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